The Indian Air Force in joint operations – A desperate need!

Team Udayavani, Jan 12, 2024, 11:30 AM IST

A dozen decades ago marked mankind’s inaugural venture into heavier-than-air flight, and almost as swiftly, aircraft found themselves conscripted for military purposes. Initially relegated to supporting land campaigns under the umbrella of armies, aviation’s trajectory took a profound turn during World War I. The spectacular evolution of aviation technology and concurrent developments in air power theory propelled the transformation of supporting air arms into independent air forces.

In the realm of military strategy, the standalone impact of air power is undeniably significant, yet the consensus remains that air forces alone cannot claim victory in warfare. Conversely, in contemporary warfare, the success of ground campaigns hinges heavily on the seamless integration of air forces. A substantial portion of air power application in joint campaigns often extends far beyond the geographical confines of the land or sea conflict.

However, the historical collaboration between air forces and surface forces has been far from smooth, marked by challenges and disagreements. In the Indian context, the extent and nature of air support that the Indian Air Force (IAF) should extend to the Indian Army and Navy have been persistent points of contention among the three services.

Despite a shared foundation at the National Defence Academy (NDA), joint staff courses at the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), and collaborative endeavours at the National Defence College (NDC), the issue of air power in joint operations remains an area where consensus is elusive.

Amidst these disagreements, the Indian military has witnessed remarkable instances of joint operations where air power has been effectively employed alongside surface forces. This article delves into the complexities and dynamics of air power utilisation in joint operations within the Indian context.

The Doctrine

In the realm of military strategy and joint operations, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) unveiled the ‘Joint Doctrine of the Armed Forces’ in 2006, initially as a classified document. Subsequently, a declassified version emerged in 2017, with the purpose of consolidating and harmonising the principles of various services into a unified guideline for executing Joint Operations. Despite its aspiration to be the definitive guide on integration and jointmanship, the reality suggests lingering differences in the perspectives of individual service branches, differences that may have intensified with the government’s announcement of its intent to establish theatre commands.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) had taken a proactive step in 1995 by formulating a classified Air Power Doctrine, later revised in 2007 after drawing insights from conflicts such as the one in Kargil. In 2012, an unclassified version, the “Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force,” was disseminated. Its preface outlines three key aerial campaigns: Counter Air, Counter Surface Force, and Strategic, emphasising that “Airpower remains the lynchpin of any joint application of combat power in modern warfare.”

The IAF defines its mission as the pursuit of “strategic reach and capabilities across the spectrum of conflict,” serving diplomatic, nation-building, and force projection objectives within India’s strategic sphere. Interestingly, while the term “Jointmanship” finds a place in the Joint Doctrine, the IAF doctrine opts for “jointness” as the preferred terminology.

Unheard Divergence!

The establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) position was a significant move aimed at fostering jointmanship and a more unified approach, particularly concerning the use of air power in joint operations. However, a discordant note was introduced by General Bipin Rawat, the inaugural CDS, a few months into his tenure. Addressing a seminar in Delhi, he caught analysts off guard by asserting, “Do not forget that the Air Force continues to remain a supporting arm to the armed forces, just as artillery or engineers support the combatant arms in the Army. They will be a supporting arm.”

These words, unsettling for the Indian Air Force (IAF) – the world’s fourth-largest air force – seemed to relegate it to a subservient role under the Indian Army, disregarding a century of air power application and challenging the lessons learned from military history.

General Rawat’s statement, made at a think-tank, revealed his perspective on the role of air power in joint operations, adding a layer of complexity to the ongoing debate on theatre commands.

In response, the Chief of Air Staff (CAS), speaking later, sought to downplay the assertion, stating, “It is not a supporting role alone. Air power has a massive role to offer. Several considerations have to go into any air plan that is crafted. And those are the issues that are under discussion.” However, this subtle clarification did not prevent other veterans, from both the air force and the army, from expressing their criticism of the CDS’s stance. Notably, General Rawat refrained from providing any explicit clarification that his statement was specific to the support the Indian Army required from the IAF and did not negate the broader strategic and independent roles and tasks of the IAF.

The pronouncement by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) brought to the forefront the contrasting perspectives held by the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force. The crux of the issue lies in the Army’s view of a commander as someone responsible for forces and assets directly under their command.

While this concept appears straightforward, the flip side is complex. The Indian Army tends to consider anything beyond its immediate command as not readily available when needed. This mindset significantly influences the employment of air power, with an Army Commander preferring air assets physically present in the geographical area under their command, along with the associated personnel for executing missions promptly.

This philosophy manifested in the Indian Army’s stance in 1986 when it argued for placing all Indian Air Force (IAF) helicopters with offensive roles under its command, deeming these roles as supporting land forces. However, due to the Army’s lack of resources and expertise in maintaining and administering helicopter fleets, the government decided to maintain administrative control with the IAF while shifting operational control to the Indian Army. This arrangement, formalised under the ‘Joint Implementation Instruction 1986,’ proved to be less than satisfactory for both services.

Despite considerable progress since then, the fundamental philosophical discord persists, with the Indian Army seeking command over air assets and the IAF emphasising the indivisibility of these assets. This ongoing divergence continues to impede advancements in the establishment of theatre commands.

When it comes to Theatre Commands

The concept of theatre commands is envisioned to usher in much-needed levels of integration and jointmanship among the three branches of the Indian military. While media reports have highlighted the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) reservations about the concept, successive Chiefs of Air Staff and various IAF veterans, including a retired Chief of Air Staff, have generally clarified that the IAF is not inherently opposed to theatre commands. Instead, their concerns revolve around the envisioned structure of these commands and their appropriateness in the Indian context.

Comparisons are often drawn with theatre commands in the United States, Russia, and China, with their vast military capabilities. However, it’s crucial to note the significant disparity in aircraft numbers, where the U.S. possesses about 20 times more aircraft than India, and Russia’s and China’s figures are five times greater. The IAF, with an inventory of around 30 squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42, faces a real two-front threat, evident in exercises like Shaheen, conducted jointly by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) since 2011.

Contrasting this with Exercise Gagan Shakti conducted by the IAF in 2018, aimed at rehearsing a two-front war scenario, reveals a practical constraint. Due to limited combat aircraft assets, the exercise was conducted sequentially in two phases on different fronts. This highlights the IAF’s challenge in deploying sufficient assets simultaneously on two fronts, let alone distributing them among six theatres, including three land theatres, one Air Defence Command, one Maritime Command, and the Andaman and Nicobar Command, all while addressing strategic tasks.

In the context of any war scenario, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is obligated to execute its primary campaigns, which include Offensive Counter Air, Air Defence, and Strategic operations. Concurrently, the IAF must engage in Counter Surface Force operations, encompassing Air Interdiction and Battlefield Air Strike in the Air Land concept, and Anti-shipping Strikes and Coastal Strikes in the Maritime Air Operations context. While these operations are predominantly tactical, they may assume a strategic dimension. In this scenario, the allocation of flying effort, rather than aircraft, to theatres becomes essential, contingent on the progress of operations in each theatre.

A centralised control mechanism for prioritising the use of scarce, multi-role aircraft seems more practical than placing assets under the command of one theatre, which might be reluctant to temporarily relinquish them to another theatre. Modern fighter aircraft, with their multi-role capabilities, are best utilised when their flexibility is leveraged. Tying them down to one specific role or geographical theatre limits their potential. Aircraft should be allocated or utilised from various theatres based on the overall progress of operations across the entire front.

Joint Action and Bottom Line

In preparation for the establishment of theatre commands, an increased number of cross-postings between the three services has been planned. As of the end of May 2023, the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) issued instructions mandating the inclusion of elements from all three services in all future military exercises and war games. This directive emphasises the move towards greater jointmanship among the services, aligning with the government’s overarching plan for theatre commands. Notably, even the traditionally standalone Exercise Vayu Shakti, an affair led by the Indian Air Force (IAF), is slated to transform into a tri-service exercise starting with the 2024 edition.

The frequency of joint exercises has seen a gradual rise, reflecting the commitment to fostering a unified approach among the armed forces. Recent exercises have included activities such as practising multimode insertion of strategic forces into the Eastern sector at short notice. The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) conducted Exercise Kavach between February and April 2023, involving the Indian Army, Indian Navy, IAF, and the Indian Coast Guard. This large-scale joint exercise incorporated air-landed operations, heli-borne operations, and rapid troop insertions from mainland Indian bases, showcasing the integration of air power in joint operations.

In the maritime domain, both the IAF and the Indian Navy demonstrated their capabilities in joint operations. The IAF conducted missions over the Indian Ocean, featuring four Rafale jets in a six-hour-long mission and a Su-30 in an eight-hour mission. Simultaneously, the Indian Navy carried out an exercise in the Arabian Sea, coordinating the deployment of two aircraft carriers, a diverse fleet of ships, submarines, and 35 aircraft. These exercises underscore the importance of air power in joint maritime operations, particularly given the geopolitical dynamics in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, where China has been actively asserting its influence in recent months.

By Girish Linganna

(The author of this article is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru. He is also Director of ADD Engineering Components, India, Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany. You can reach out to him at: [email protected])

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